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Abstract
We address a recurring problem in movement scholarship and activism:
why do some civil rights organizations persist in promoting themselves as
advocates of equal protection when street activists rarely mention it, and
lawyers know that litigation brought under that clause almost always loses?
Try to recall the last time you heard of a street protest by a group—say
Mexican-American school children in Tucson, Arizona, Black victims of
police violence, or military women subjected to sexual harassment—
proceeding under the banner of equal protection. Or think when you last
read of a lawyer who brought and won a case for a client alleging that some
form of official treatment violated that guarantee because the official action
fell unequally on the client’s group vis-à-vis another.
If these causes of action are practically dead letters, why do institutions
continue to evoke them on official occasions, fundraising appeals, and their
websites? We show how equal protection has receded in importance as a
means of advancing the interests of outsider groups, yet traditional
organizations that advertise themselves as representing those interests
continue to be wedded to it. Drawing on critical race scholarship, including
our own, we show how better means are available for advancing the goals of
these groups, including street demonstrations, struggle, righteous
indignation, and voting. Institutions such as the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) know this yet continue to press
their case with unceasing fervor. We offer an explanation for why this is so
and conclude by urging methods that are likely to prove more productive.
Introduction
According to recent polls, a majority of Americans believe that Black
people suffer discrimination, with some surveys reporting as many as
seventy percent holding this belief.1 In the public mind, Muslims and recent
immigrants of Latin American origin may be just as disadvantaged because
of abuse at the hands of the current administration and right-wing media.2
* John J. Sparkman Chair of Law, University of Alabama School of Law.
** Professor and Clement Research Affiliate, University of Alabama School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Juliana Menasce Horowitz et al., Social and Demographic Trends 2019,
PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2019/04/09/race-in-amer
ica-2019/ (discussing social science studies of racial attitudes); Charles Blow, In the Wake of
Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/09/opinion/blacklives-matter-protests.html (putting the figure at seventy percent for Americans who believe
the criminal justice system is unfair toward minorities).
2. See Richard Delgado, J’Accuse: An Essay on Animus, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE
119 (2018) (noting the recent tide of hate speech directed against this group). See also
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Yet only a relatively small number of antidiscrimination lawsuits by
these groups and others are successful, particularly those brought under the
Equal Protection Clause or federal civil rights statutes.3 Evidently,
minorities suffer a great deal of discrimination, but relatively few courts find
in their favor when they sue for it under the Equal Protection Clause. If this
were true for automobile crashes or surgical malpractice, lawyers would stop
taking these cases, and nonprofits and government agencies in the business
of improving highway safety or medical outcomes would abandon litigation
in favor of more promising strategies.4
With minorities who suffer discrimination, sue for it, and lose, one
might wonder, why they persist in pursuing this means of redress. It might
be that minorities suffer from poor legal representation, while the
perpetrators of racist treatment have very good defense lawyers.5
Conceivably, the typical claim that finds its way to court might be weak—in
other words, minorities with the poorest claims sue regularly and lose, while
those who suffer the most flagrant abuse suffer quietly and do not sue at all.6
Needless to say, each of these explanations is implausible.
Why, then, is the success rate of civil rights litigation so low? We posit
that equality-based antidiscrimination law itself suffers defects that render it
an unattractive vehicle for achieving redress for victims of discrimination.7
Horowitz, supra note 1, observing that fifty-six percent of Americans believe African
Americans experience discrimination, with fifty-one percent believing the same for
Hispanics.
3. See TRACEY KUYKILHAHN & TOM H. COHEN, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS
COMPLAINTS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 1990-2006 (Aug. 2008) (reporting that about one-third
of cases that go to trial are successful). See also Race & Gender of Judges Make Enormous
Differences in Rulings, A.B.A.J. (Feb. 7, 2010) (reporting that relatively few are successful
and that the background of the judge makes a difference). For a discussion of the low rate of
success of racial-harassment cases, see text and infra note 9.
4. See WILLIAM PROSSER, PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 227, 254–55
(5th ed. 1984) (noting that some cases of this type, which may fall under the doctrines of
negligence per se or res ipsa loquitur, are comparatively easy to win).
5. This explanation is implausible. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund and MALDEF
(Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund) are considered among the best in
terms of technical expertise.
6. It seems much more likely that those with weak claims refrain from suing, while
those who suffered flagrant discrimination consult a lawyer and file for redress. Engaging a
lawyer is, for the average person, a major cost. Why make the investment if one’s likelihood
of success is poor?
7. See text and infra notes 15–114, discussing the various types, and Parts I to IV, infra,
discussing each in detail. See also Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (noting that
antidiscrimination doctrine can actually enhance inequality). Professor Freeman was one of
the earliest members of critical legal studies (CLS), a predecessor movement that contributed
to the development of critical race theory.
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Despite these defects, which are well known,8 organizations like the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund maintain a brisk business raising money, publicizing the
horrors of discrimination, and suing carefully chosen discriminators,
generally losing or winning narrow, short-lived victories.9
To be sure, equality is sometimes the only tool available to civil rights
litigators.10 And merely invoking it can bring symbolic benefits.11 Suits for
unequal treatment resonate with the public. Everyone knows that favoritism
and unequal treatment are wrong and violate our sense of justice. Even
kindergarten children know that a teacher who favors pet students and
dispenses rewards and punishments unequally is a tyrant.
But litigation under the Equal Protection Clause is neither the only, nor
the most important source of redress for beleaguered minorities. Struggle,
solidarity, voting, protests, and righteous indignation are, to our way of
thinking, much more promising means of securing relief from systemic
oppression.12 Yet civil rights organizations, historically committed to equal
8. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 7. See also text and supra note 3, infra note 9,
discussing the poor success rate of these suits.
9. See, e.g., Pat E. Chew & Robert K. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An
Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117 (2009) (noting
the low rate of success in these cases). See also GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008) (discussing why courts are
relatively powerless to redress longstanding social inequities).
10. Women suing for salaries equal to those of men performing the same work are
examples of invoking equality in a way that makes perfectly good sense.
11. See text and infra notes 47–49, noting these symbolic effects.
12. Imagine how peculiar it would seem to see a group of Latino schoolchildren
marching down the street with placards complaining that their educational options were not
the equal of those of another racial group. They might easily protest that the public schools
were dilapidated, or the teachers and curriculum unresponsive to their needs. They might
complain of harsh disciplinary policies that fell heavily on Latinos who were late to school
because working parents had no reliable way to get them there on time. But it is extremely
unlikely that they would frame any of these complaints in terms of equal protection.
Other approaches have simply struck minority groups as more promising. See Richard
Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2411, 2437 (1989) (making the case for solidarity); Thea Riobrancos, It’s a Tough Time for
the Left. But I’m More Optimistic Than Ever, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2020), https://www.ny
times.com/2020/08/09/opinion/left-politics.html. See also Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (making the
case for interest convergence); ROSENBERG, supra note 9 (demonstrating that means other
than litigation are apt to be more effective at producing lasting change).
The NAACP’s website, however, has long highlighted the organization’s commitment
to equality as a central approach. See NAACP, https://www.naacp.org/about-us/ (last visited
Oct. 10, 2020) (noting that “Our mission is to secure the political, educational, social, and
economic equality of rights in order to eliminate race-based discrimination and ensure the
health and well-being of all persons.”) The NAACP Legal Defense Fund, a separate
organization, also identifies itself with the search for equality. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE
FUND, https://www.naacpldf.org/about-us/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2020) (noting that “LDF
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protection, routinely give scant attention to these other options—particularly
when they are raising money or marshalling public support against the latest
affront from an indifferent—or malevolent administration.13
This incongruity is noteworthy because many of these pathways—
struggle, solidarity, and righteous indignation—played vital roles in the
American Revolution that led to the adoption of the Constitution in the first
place,14 with voting arriving some years later with the Bill of Rights.15 And
the Declaration of Independence and Constitution mention these alternatives
prominently in their preambles and provisions protecting freedom of speech,
petition, and assembly.16
With economic inequality standing at a higher level today than ever,17
it behooves legal thinkers to consider why constitutional protection of
equality has yielded so little relief. We concede that things might easily have
been worse without it.18 Still, if a tool does not reliably yield its intended
result, it is worth considering why this may be so. The tool may have become
rusty for lack of use, or dull from too much use and in need of sharpening.
Or perhaps the tool has changed, rendering the tool less useful than it has
been theretofore.19

seeks structural changes to expand democracy, eliminate disparities, and achieve racial
justice in a society that fulfills the promise of equality for all Americans”).
13. See Leon W. Russell, Chairman of the Board, Address to the 108th NAACP Annual
Convention (July 23, 2017), https://www.naacp.org/latest/naacp-forward/ (reminding listeners
that the organization stands for “equity, equality, and justice for all.”).
14. See, e.g., Eric Foner, Battle Over the Revolution, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, https://
www.nybooks.com/articles/1973/02/22/battle-over-the-revolution/ (last accessed Sept. 30,
2020). Consider, for example, the role of pamphleteering and public calls for action—Paul
Revere’s cry and ride—in marshalling support for colonial action against the Crown.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (protecting the right to vote).
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting speech and association); THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (noting that the King committed a number of transgressions and
abuses against the colonies, including unfair taxes and foisting unwanted immigrants on
them).
17. See Lola Fadulu, Study Shows Income Gap Between Rich and Poor Keeps Growing,
with Deadly Effects, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/10/us/
politics/gao-income-gap-rich-poor.html.
18. The country could easily be even less democratic than it is today. Slavery and Jim
Crow would undoubtedly have been harder to combat. See also text and infra notes 47–49
discussing the clauses’ symbolic effect. Other symbolic effects might include public
sympathy or an increase in solidarity among the disaffected group. A trial, even a losing one,
may serve as a platform to educate the public over important issues that they ought to consider.
A trial may also serve to rally supporters to try harder next time. It may also inform the
judiciary of a new issue requiring future treatment. See JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT
VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE IN AMERICA (2003).
19. To take a familiar example, the new version of a product may require a Phillips
screwdriver to tighten it, whereas the former version required an ordinary one. A new light
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In what follows, we consider these and other possibilities. We conclude
that equality jurisprudence should not be the automatic choice for every civil
rights struggle. It is a helpful strategy on carefully selected occasions. But
advocates should note its limitations and be on the watch for more effective
choices depending on the precise situation confronting them.
The limitations we shall discuss include structural features of
inequality, discussed in Part I, conceptual problems inherent in equal
protection as a remedy for discrimination, discussed in Part II, and doctrinal
barriers, in Part III. Part IV addresses problems afflicting binary approaches
to racial remedies. Part V asks why certain civil rights organizations persist
in the equality approach despite its poor track record, concluding that it is a
good vehicle for soliciting contributions, marshalling the troops, signaling
virtue, and little else.
I. Structural Hurdles
A. Forms of Treatment Unique to One Group
One stumbling block is that equality jurisprudence predisposes legal
actors to make comparisons between two things or groups, A and B.20 For
example, this might mean comparing the treatment of Blacks and whites and
demanding that it be not too disparate or favor one over the other.
This approach is sometimes useful for Black people since whites often
subordinate them using official power or concerted private action to do so.21
But equality is often considerably less useful with other groups. Native
Americans, for example, are not so much interested in equality with whites,
as in sovereignty—they want whites to leave them alone to manage their own
affairs.22 The group’s foundational experience was not slavery and Jim
Crow, but removal from their homelands and the destruction of tribal self-

bulb may require a new socket, or a new socket a different bulb. Removing a battery on a
recent-model car may require a socket wrench. And so on.
20. See Juan Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science”
of American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1213 (1997) (discussing how racial discourse
and law tend to revolve around two central groups, the Black and the white).
21. See generally DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (6th ed. 2008)
(discussing the many ways this has happened throughout history). Bell is, of course, a prime
exponent of critical race theory, indeed one of the founders of the movement.
22. See, e.g., JUAN PEREA, ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND MATERIALS FOR A
DIVERSE AMERICA 2, 229–59 (3d ed. 2015) (discussing the struggle to preserve this form of
tribal autonomy).
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rule.23 Gaining equal access to housing or to desegregated schools is simply
not high on their agenda, at least compared with self-rule.
Nor is it so for many Latino/a activists. This group's formative
experience was not slavery or Jim Crow, but Conquest, land loss, and
destruction of culture in the wake of territorial takeovers.24 Harsh
immigration laws that often target this group might seem like candidates for
challenge under the Equal Protection Clause, but the Plenary Power doctrine
permits immigration law to be as unfair as the Administration wishes25—and
much of the same is true for English-only laws and other measures that
disadvantage Latinos and few others.26 Equality jurisprudence is simply not
a helpful way of framing or addressing problems like these and may easily
make matters worse.27
Asian Americans do not suffer the same forms of unjust treatment as do
Blacks. The large groups, Chinese and Japanese, are not economically
depressed, at least not across the board.28 But they are treated as foreign,
even though their ancestors may have lived here for many generations, and
during wartime or outbreaks of a new virus they may suffer removal,
quarantine, or limitations on immigration and travel; none of which are easy
to redress under current equality doctrine.

23. JUAN PEREA, ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND MATERIALS FOR A DIVERSE
AMERICA 2, 1–2 (3d ed. 2015) (discussing the role of foundational experiences in shaping the
histories of each minority group). For Indians, see id. at 126, 610, 617 (excerpting articles
and legal documents concerning Indian removal). See also Carole Goldberg, Descent into
Race, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1373 (2002). For other groups, the foundational experience may be
slavery, conquest, or exclusion.
24. PEREA ET AL., supra note 22, at 2, 285, 288–94. See also Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d
938 (Colo. 2002) (en banc) (challenging traditional land claims in southern Colorado); U.S.
GOV’T GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO: FINDINGS
AND POSSIBLE OPTIONS REGARDING LONGSTANDING COMMUNITY LAND GRANT CLAIMS IN
NEW MEXICO, at 1–3 (2004) (analyzing irregularities leading to confiscation of Mexicanowned land in years following the War with Mexico and discussing possible remedies).
25. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
26. See PEREA ET AL., supra note 22 at 557–64, 792–800 (discussing English-only rules
and their effects on Spanish speakers).
27. See Part IV infra (discussing structural problems arising from a black-white binary
approach).
28. See Rakeesh Kochhar and Anthony Cilluffo, Income Inequality is Rising Most
Rapidly Among Asians, PEW RES. CTR. (July 12, 2018), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/
2018/07/12/ income-inequality-in-the-u-s-is-rising-most-rapidly-among-asians (discussing
average family income for various Asian-American groups). Many Asian subgroups, such as
Laotians and Cambodians are more recent arrivals and much less prosperous that Japanese
and Chinese. Id.
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B. Neglecting the Frame or Field
Many of the problems that limit the utility of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments for Black people are doctrinal—judicially created—
so that courts, if they were so inclined, could do away with them. We discuss
these in Part III.29 But a number of structural problems limit their utility for
any group, including Blacks. One such problem is the way in which singleminded focus on equality can easily cause one to overlook disadvantaging
factors that inhere in the very way inequality analysis frames problems.
Equality tends to focus attention on disparities in the treatment of
people within a given field, overlooking ones that are inherent in the field or
frame.30 Consider a few examples, one a recent Latino confrontation with
the authorities, and another from Black civil rights history:
1. Tucson School Controversy
The Arizona legislature enacted a law aimed at abolishing a highly
successful program of Mexican American Studies (“MAS”) in the public
schools of Tucson.31 Taught by energetic young teachers, many of them
graduates of the University of Arizona’s famed Ethnic Studies program, the
program attracted students from that city’s large Mexican American
community, most of them children of working-class immigrant parents.32
Before the program began, the drop-out rate for this group had hovered
around fifty percent. After students learned about the great civilizations of
Meso-America and the accomplishments of writers and artists like Sandra
Cisneros and Diego Rivera, as well as the Civil Rights Movement, Martin
Luther King Jr., and Cesar Chavez, the graduation rate increased to over
ninety percent.33 Many decided they wanted to go to college and become
doctors, lawyers, or novelists.34

29. See infra Part III.
30. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Borders by Consent, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
337 (2020) (discussing the need for structural reform of borders and immigration). See also
GEORGE LAKOFF, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) (discussing the role of framing in the
formation and persistence of belief); Matt Bei, The Framing Wars, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17,
2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/17/magazine/the-framing-wars.html.
31. See Richard Delgado, Precious Knowledge: State Bans on Ethnic Studies, Book
Traffickers (Librotraficantes) and a New Type of Race Trial, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1513 (2013)
(discussing the Tucson case and its implications for racial equity in schools).
32. Delgado, supra note 31, at 1530.
33. See PRECIOUS KNOWLEDGE (Independent Lens Co. 2011) (film depicting these events
and the role of the principal players in the Tucson drama).
34. Id.
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Authorities in the state’s capital were unimpressed. Convinced that the
district was teaching dangerous ideas, the legislature enacted HB 2281,
prohibiting the teaching of any course designed primarily for students from
a particular ethnic group, designed to increase racial solidarity rather than
treatment of persons on an individual basis, aimed at the overthrow of the
American government, or at inculcating racial resentment.35 Any district
found to violate the law could be punished by withholding up to ten percent
of their state budget.36
The state superintendent paid a brief visit to one of the MAS
classrooms, delivered a speech outside the school, and declared the program
out of compliance with the statute.37
An administrative law judge agreed with the superintendent and, for
good measure, banned seven texts, including Paolo Freire’s Pedagogy of the
Oppressed, Howard Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States, Critical
Race Theory: An Introduction, by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic,38 and
William Shakespeare’s The Tempest.39 To make sure that everyone got the
message, staff members boxed up the offending books in front of crying
students and trucked them off to a distant warehouse.40
Two students sued, but a federal district court upheld the state’s action
as a legitimate exercise in curricular control.41 After a partial reversal by the
Ninth Circuit,42 the case returned for retrial in front of the same judge who
had earlier found against the program. This time, the judge found for the
students, and the school board restored the program in a watered-down
form.43
Where did equality and inequality figure in? The schoolchildren’s
complaint was not that the statute treated white and Latino kids differently.
35. See PRECIOUS KNOWLEDGE (Independent Lens Co. 2011) (film depicting these events
and the role of the principal players in the Tucson drama).
36. See Delgado, supra note 31, at 1522 (describing the statute and the events leading up
to its enactment).
37. See PRECIOUS KNOWLEDGE, supra note 33 (depicting these events and some of the
principal characters).
38. Id.
39. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Banning Books in Arizona, ACADEME BLOG
(Jan. 24, 2012), academeblog.org/2012/01/24/book-banning-in-arizona/ (discussing bookbanning and book–burning throughout history).
40. Delgado, supra note 31, at 1523–24.
41. Id. at 1530–32. By “curricular control” we mean authoritative designation of the
prescribed course of study.
42. Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968, 990 (9th Cir. 2015).
43. See Hank Stephenson, TUSD Board Sidesteps Efforts to Resurrects Aspects of
Mexican American Studies, ARIZ. STAR (Jan. 31, 2018), https://tucson.com/news/local/tusdboard-majority-sidesteps-effort-to-resurrect-aspects-of-mexican/article_620f0e1b-6b09-57c
3-ae4c-342130d3b612.html.
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Rather, it was that the authorities insisted on teaching everyone the same
course of study, featuring kings, heroic colonial figures like Paul Revere,
battles like Gettysburg, and inventors like Thomas Edison, even though that
approach failed to engage the schoolchildren and struck them as irrelevant
to their culture and experiences.44
In short, the problem was not that the authorities treated the brown
students differently from the way they treated the white ones. That would
have been a classic equal protection problem. Rather, the frame itself—an
Anglocentric curriculum—was the source of the problem. To its credit, the
Ninth Circuit recognized its nature, and, without forcing it into a Fourteenth
Amendment framework, found in the students’ favor.45
2. Brown v. Board of Education
A second example draws from African American history. Until 1954,
school authorities in the South typically assigned white pupils to one school
and Black kids to another.46 Often, the schools were funded roughly
equally.47 Within a frame that merely considered the tangible resources
(books, classrooms, teacher salaries) available in both sets of school, they
may have appeared nearly equal. But when evaluated in terms of the
symbolic message the assignment scheme sent, they were not equal at all.48
The frame itself was discriminatory, something that took the American court
system close to a century and much gallant lawyering to recognize.49

44. See Christine E. Sleeter, Ph.D., The Academic and Social Value of Ethnic Studies: A
Research Review, NAT’L EDU. ASS’N (2011), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED521869.pdf.
(reflecting on her testimony before the district court in the Tucson school district); see also
Julie Depenbrock, Federal Judge Finds Racism Behind Arizona Law Banning Ethnic Studies,
NPR (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/08/22/545402866/federal-judg
e-finds-racism-behind-arizona-law-banning-ethnic-studies (discussing Professor Sleeter’s
findings and testimony in the trial).
45. See Maggi Astor, Tucson’s Mexican America Studies Was a Victim of ‘Racial
Animus,’ Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/23/
us/arizona-mexican-american-ruling.html (discussing the retrial).
46. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954).
47. See also Mendez v. Westminster School Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946)
(noting that much the same was true in a case concerning Mexican American schoolchildren
and their right to attend school in classes with whites and not just children of their own
ethnicity).
48. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 491 (noting that the damage was apt to be long-lasting—“in
a way unlikely to be ever undone”).
49. See, e.g., William Harvey et al., The Impact of the Brown v. Board of Education
Decision on Postsecondary Education of African Americans, 73 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328 (2004)
(describing how the decision counteracted poisonous stereotypes).
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3. Immigration and Deportation
A further area, immigration policy, introduces a form of inequality that
can target almost any minority group. In a recent article, the two of us
showed that a host of current problems—family separation, unlawful
detention, and refusal to consider refugee states when law provides—are
products of violence rather than a lack of equality.50 Once one sees
immigration measures in that light, the nature of the problem comes into
focus and the search for remedies can begin.51 For example, one can see how
what we called multi-group oppression advances several interests of the
Republican Party at the expense of those of minorities and the Democrats, in
a manner tantamount to a new Southern Strategy.52
II. Conceptual Limits on Enforcing Decrees
Equality-based remedies for racial wrongs often encounter poor
reception or incomprehension by the authorities responsible for putting them
into effect.53 Many such decrees are apt to spark strenuous resistance, even
from public officials who believe themselves champions of law and order—
even ones who consider themselves stout defenders of equality.54 Consider
a few ways this can arise.
A. Disbelief
With Brown v. Board of Education, Southern authorities resisted the
landmark decree, first maintaining that it only applied to schools, or just K12 schools, and not to public swimming pools, restaurants, and movie
theatres.55 Still others insisted that it applied only to the parties before the
court (plaintiffs named Brown and administrators of school districts in
Kansas).56 Authorities throughout the South reacted to the landmark

50. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 30 (explaining the concept, its roots in the work
of theoretician Jacques Derrida, and its application to the law of borders and immigration).
51. Id. (discussing possible solutions to border violence).
52. See generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Multi-Group Oppression and a
Theory of Judicial Review, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2017) (naming and discussing the new
strategy).
53. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Social Construction of Brown v. Board
of Education, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 547 (1995) (discussing the social construction of the
famous case and explaining how the decision failed fully to generalize).
54. Id. at 550.
55. Id. at 555.
56. Id. at 550 (discussing this resistance).
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decision with disbelief: Surely, the Supreme Court could not have been
intending this (viz, full integration).
Earlier, we explained this resistance as a product of a “reconstructive
paradox” that sets in when a judicial decree threatens to change the status
quo in wide-ranging fashion.57 A number of scholars have pointed out that
social reform through law is laborious and halting because law’s scope is so
narrow—most lawsuits proceed with a single plaintiff suing for a single harm
that is capable of redress in the case at hand.58 But, with institutional
litigation, a new set of difficulties arise in connection with enforcement.
Because every social practice is part of an interlocking system of practices,
meanings, and interpretations, changing just one element (for example,
school assignment rules) leaves the rest unchanged.59
Thus, when the Supreme Court decided Brown, its decree was soon
robbed of much effect when, in a myriad of decisions, school officials, lower
courts, sheriffs, and others interpreted Brown against the familiar
background of beliefs and practices.60 “Of course, the Supreme Court didn't
mean that,” they would reason in new case after new case.
It is as though legal decisions take place against a gravitational field,
with the pull being toward the familiar—stasis. Because Brown set out to
change just one element, leaving the force-field itself intact, its effect quickly
eroded. For social reform to happen, “everything must change at once”; but
legal doctrines such as stare decisis, standing, mootness, ripeness, and
political question mean that the law cannot change everything at once. It can
only decide the case before it.61
Dubious local officials are not the only forces that rob landmark
decisions of much of their effect. If that were true, all that would be
necessary would be vigilance and determined enforcement carried out over
time. Rather, such decisions fail to establish themselves in the wider legal
culture, so that even those who are sympathetic to reform fail to see their
applications in closely related areas. “Swimming pools” southern officials
asked in the wake of Brown— surely the Supreme Court didn’t mean we had
to desegregate them, and so on for movie theatres, restaurants, public
bathrooms, and water fountains.

57. See infra Part II, C (discussing the paradox).
58. See, for example, rules of standing, e.g., Warth v. Selden, 422 U.S. 990 (1975) and
other prudential doctrines such as mootness and ripeness which have much the same effect.
59. See text and infra notes 52–53.
60. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 53, at 554–55 (discussing this limitation and its
application to Brown).
61. Id. at 551.
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B. Colorblindness
This problem is not limited to situations where the party from whom a
decree requires change of some sort is strongly resistant because of a
longstanding practice, such as a Southerner contemplating desegregation.
Consider, for example, the relatively recent debate over campus hate speech
rules.62 Beginning in the late 1990s, college and university administrators
began noticing an upsurge in the number of racist insults, graffiti, and namecalling taking place on their campuses.63 At some, minority enrollment
began to drop as parents decided to send their sons and daughters to schools
like Howard or Spelman where the atmosphere might be more supportive.64
To avoid these consequences, many mainstream campuses responded by
enacting anti-hate speech rules that punished certain forms of racial or sexual
epithets. These rules sparked immediate resistance from free-speech
organization like the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) or
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (“FIRE”).65
Brown at least had some effect. Today, a school official who might be
tempted to assign all the Black children to one school and the white or
Latino/a ones to another might easily hesitate, thinking “I had better avoid
doing that, at least for now, and, when I do it, disguise what I am doing.”
Today’s opponents of hate speech rules, however, show little such
compunction—they proceed as though Brown had not taken place at all.
Hate speech controversies are in many respects like ones over studentassignment practices.66 Yet, opponents make the same arguments and
rhetorical moves that society did with other forms of discrimination in
former years, including the idea that for complaining parties, the problem is
all in their heads.67

62. See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in
Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343 (1991) (discussing how controversies over campus speech
codes can be seen in two ways—as struggles over the right of free speech guaranteed by the
First Amendment, on one hand, or ones over the right to equality and equal status on the other,
vouchsafed by the Fourteenth).
63. Id. at 348–53.
64. Id. at 376, 378 n. 354.
65. Mainly from the free speech camp. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, Dubious
Arguments for Curbing the Free Speech of Nazis, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/outlook/dubious-arguments-for-curbing-the-free-speech-of-nazis/2018/
01/31/495cd256-fc96-11e7-8f66-2df0b94bb98a_story.html.
66. Namely, both are degrading, but not seen as such at the time. See Charles Lawrence,
If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Hate Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (1990)
(arguing that Brown v. Board of Education was, in reality, a case about hate speech).
67. See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 53, at 553.
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Under Plessy v. Ferguson,68 laws that distributed public goods (seats in
the railroad car set aside for whites) along racial lines were upheld, so long
as the benefit Blacks received was roughly comparable to that received by
whites. The Supreme Court upheld the practice—separate but equal. Whites
and Blacks were equally disadvantaged; neither could ride in the other’s car.
A similar situation prevailed in the schools of Topeka, Kansas, at the
time Brown was decided. Indeed, shortly after the decision came down, a
prominent scholar wondered if the decision was principled: Why should the
right of Blacks to associate with whites trump that of whites not to associate
with Blacks?69 One right balanced another, one claim against its perfect
reciprocal.
The debate about hate speech proceeds in strikingly similar fashion.
The white insists on a right to say whatever is on his mind. The Black
demands protection when what is on the white’s mind is a face-to-face racial
insult.70 One claims a right to do X, the other the right not to have X done to
him. One right emanates from one part of the Constitution—the First
Amendment—the other from a different part, the Fourteenth.71 As with
separate but equal, today's debate over hate speech features commentators
insisting that the Black’s injury is all in his head72—an insistence that echoes
early cases in which the Supreme Court told African Americans that the
indignity of being shunted off to separate facilities is offensive only because
they chose to put that construction on it.73 Contemporary opponents of hate
speech rules dismiss the Black’s injury as merely dignitary—a mere matter
of wounded feelings—an “offense” and not a real harm.74 One scholar
rejected the argument that hate speech silences its target, thus reducing the
amount of speech on campus, by pointing out that silencing requires mental

68. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
69. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 53, at 552 (discussing Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
70. That is, the white’s intention.
71. Delgado, supra note 62, at 345–48 (noting that in each struggle between liberty and
equality [the First and Fourteenth Amendments], liberty almost always wins).
72. E.g., “I said that just in fun, you’re a snowflake.” See DINESH D’SOUZA, ILLIBERAL
EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS 132–36, 156 (1991); NAT HENTOFF,
FREE SPEECH FOR ME BUT NOT FOR THEE (1992) (observing that minorities seem ready to
complain of imagined or exaggerated slights). But see ULRICH BAER, WHAT SNOWFLAKES
GET RIGHT (2020) (noting that commentators like these got it wrong).
73. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
74. See Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal,
DUKE L.J. 484, 498 (1990) (characterizing the injury to minorities as merely a momentary
discomfort or feeling of offense).
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mediation—the victim decides to remain silent.75 As with Brown, the
opposition to hate speech rules portrays itself as highly principled. It is not
in favor of hate speech, but rather that higher principles are at stake here.
Brown effected relatively little change in terms of social consciousness
or the realities of life for Black schoolchildren.76 Yet, society has
constructed the decision as a breakthrough of momentous proportions. We
believe the two consequences stem from a common cause. Brown's sharp
departure from the past caused it to stand out—to seem a breathtaking
advance. The sharp break also assured that it would fail to “take,” or would
succumb to what one might think of as kind of social gravity.77 Let us now
spell out in greater detail of what that gravity consists.
B. The Reconstructive Paradox
This inertial drag includes the system of meanings and social
interpretations against which the new rule must operate.78 It also includes a
set of narratives, or “stock stories,” with which the new ruling is forced to
harmonize.79 It also includes a set of social practices with which the new
command must contend.80 Each of these components mitigates the new
decision's effect.
1. Meanings and Interpretations
Onlookers interpret any text, including legal ones, against a background
of meanings, presumptions, and preexisting understandings.81 If a parent
tells a child, “Clean up your room before coming down to dinner,” the terms
“clean” and “room” have well-understood meanings: the child knows he or
she is not expected to launder the drapes or vacuum under the bed. If an
adolescent tells the parent, “I’ll be back home by midnight,” both understand

75. See Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1993)
(discussing the controversy over hate speech codes under traditional First Amendment
principles).
76. As is often observed, more African American children today attend schools that are
segregated—largely Black—than they did in the Brown era.
77. See Section C, immediately infra.
78. Id.
79. See section C.1., infra.
80. Id.
81. See STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980) (discussing how communication rests on commonly
accepted meanings and interpretations); Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on
Power, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 813 (1992).
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that “midnight” means tonight, not a week from now, and “back” means
inside the house, not parked outside in the car.
The same holds true for legal commands. Thus, when Brown ordered
school districts to desegregate “with all deliberate speed,”82 southern
officials interpreted the decree in terms of their common sense. In hundreds
of cases, they construed Brown to mean what it could only mean, given their
experience—integration that went not too far, not too fast, and that left the
school system as little changed as possible.
Administrators of public beaches, movie theaters, restaurants, colleges,
and universities interpreted Brown as a case affecting only K-12 schools.
Some even took the position that it bound only the districts before the court.83
To many, Brown looked like an exception, an improbable edict that should
naturally be interpreted in that light. The only way to harmonize it with
common sense was to construe it narrowly: “Of course, the Supreme Court
did not mean that Blacks and whites are strictly equal,” they told themselves.
“Nor that we now need to assign Black principals to white schools, provide
college counseling to all children including the newcomers; adopt due
process protections in disciplinary actions for Black children who
misbehave,” and so on. Because Brown was interpreted against the
background of a myriad of such understandings, traditions, habits, and
expectations, and because, unlike a parent, the Supreme Court was not
available to clarify immediately what it meant, the decision had relatively
little impact.84
It did change one thing—pupil assignment rules—but the rest of society
remained essentially the same. The gain in one area was quickly swallowed
up by interpretive effects emanating from the rest.
2. Social Practices
A second component of the force-field is the panoply of preexisting
social practices, many of which the judiciary is powerless to change. These
include: (1) friendship patterns, (2) the manner in which a teacher looks at
or responds to a Black child, (3) that child's own self-image, and (4)
expectations of treatment from white teachers, librarians, principals, school
counselors, classmates, bus drivers, crossing guards, and others. They
include who is chosen for student body president, the debate team, hall
monitor, prom date, and cheerleading squad. If all of these practices remain
82. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown II).
83. See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 11820, 565–607 (3d
ed. 1992) (noting that the decision produced a comparatively small effect for this reason,
among others).
84. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 9.
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the same while only school assignment practices change, a Black child's life
will not greatly improve after a decision like Brown and may easily be
worse.85
Of course, a legally enforced change in one area could potentially lead
to reconsideration elsewhere. When white schoolchildren begin to attend a
school in a building that would now house some Blacks, the abovementioned
social practices might also start to change. But everything we know about
cognitive dissonance suggests the opposite.86 New practices that depart
sharply from old ones encounter initial resistance and find favor only slowly
and grudgingly.87 New reasons are found to justify the newly disapproved
social practices.88
3. Narratives
A final component of the forces that militate against adoption of a new
legal decision is the myriad of narratives or stories with which the new rule
must contend.89 Narratives are the simple, script-like mottos and catchphrases, like “he hit me first,” “I had no idea it was yours,” “majority rules,”
“I’ve been waiting in line longer than you,” or “it’s always outsiders who are
causing trouble” that we use in ordering our social world.90
With school desegregation, judicial decrees confronted a host of
countervailing narratives, including “neighborhood schools are best,” “who
are these outsiders trying to tell us what to do?,” “our Negroes were happy
until . . . ,” “Black people just want to push into places where they are not
wanted,” “they want things they don't deserve and haven’t earned,”
“integration might be okay, but the schools should remain predominantly
white, and the curriculum, teachers, and so on, roughly as they are now,” and
others.91

85. We say “worse” because the child may easily meet with violence or rude treatment
at the new school.
86. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1962) (describing and
analyzing the tendency to reject new truths if they conflict with ones that an individual has
long held).
87. See id. The Black child’s plight could worsen because white parents and classmates
might see him as an interloper out to cause trouble and upset settled expectations.
88. Id.
89. See generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American
Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1258 (1992) (discussing how narratives shape discourse and consciousness).
90. See id.
91. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 9 (noting law’s resistance to change and how
social movements that proceed too rapidly are apt to spark backlash).
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Of course, these narratives could theoretically change. A person who
holds a large number of such beliefs regarding minority people,
neighborhood schools, and “the way things are” could possibly revise his or
her opinion when confronted by the image of a dignified, intelligent,
reasonable Black person at a school or workplace. But narratives are slow
to change—we tend to interpret new versions in terms of the ones that we
have held for a long time.92 These old narratives provide the very basis for
understanding new experiences, including that of our first close Black
associate. It is far easier to pronounce the Black an “exception” than to revise
one’s entire stock of beliefs.
Eventually, social stories and practices do change. But this happens
much more slowly than we like to imagine.93 And when they do, courts and
decrees play little role in bringing them about. Courts are distant institutions.
Unlike flesh-and-blood persons, they cannot follow up an exchange by
saying, for example: “no, he is not an exception; most of them are like that
if you take the trouble to get to know them.”
4. Ineffective Decrees
In short, courts are not in a position to engage society in the kind of
continuing dialogue that could readily change meanings and practices.94
They can only change one practice at a time. Everything else—the entire
system of practices, traditions, and meanings—remains the same, exerting a
gravitational tug toward the familiar. In giving effect to the new decree,
something the courts are in a position to enforce, hundreds of lower-level
bureaucrats, state officials, and lower court judges will interpret the ringing
words according to their common sense understandings.95
The combined effect of all these forces means that any reform measure
other than the most gradual will meet resistance, spur reinterpretation, and
encounter obstruction in ways that the legal system is poorly equipped to
counter.96 One perspective from which to view these forces is in terms of
what we earlier termed the “reconstructive paradox.” Our description went
something like this:

92. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 89, at 1259–60 (defining “empathic fallacy” as the
belief that we can change belief systems quickly and easily by offering better narratives).
93. See ROSENBERG, supra note 9; see also Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 89.
94. See ROSENBERG, supra note 9; see also Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 89.
95. See ROSENBERG, supra note 9; see also Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 89.
96. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 89 at 1258–59 (observing that speech and dialogue
can correct small, clearly bounded errors, but not ones that are large and systemic, since these
are relatively immune to change through narrative means alone).
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(1) The greater a social evil (for example Black subordination,
stereotypes of Latinos as criminals and rapists) the more it is apt to
be entrenched in our national practices, thought, and narratives.
(2) The more entrenched the evil, the more massive the social
effort that will be necessary to eradicate it.
(3) The harm of such a deeply rooted evil will be invisible to
many because it is embedded and commonplace.
(4) The massive effort will collide with other social values and
things we hold dear (settled expectations, religion, family, privacy,
the southern way of life, etc). This effort will entail dislocations,
shifts in spending priorities, and changes in the way we speak, act,
and relate to each other.
(5) These latter efforts, by contrast, will be highly visible and
will give rise to objections that the proponents are engaging in
totalitarian tactics, siding with big government, discomfiting
innocent whites, violating the merit principle, elevating group rights
over individual ones, reviving old grudges, and whipping up
division.
(6) Complaints like the ones just mentioned will feel perfectly
in order, righteous and proper, since the other side will appear to be
sacrificing real liberty for a nebulous goal.
For these reasons, reconstruction will often strike many in a society as
unprincipled and wrong. Little surprise, then, that few take up its cause,
persist for long in the face of resistance, or even frame their aims broadly
enough that if they come to pass, they have a chance of achieving much
effect. This seems particularly so with petitions based on unequal treatment,
for reasons we discussed earlier, supra Part I.
III. Doctrinal Barriers
In addition to conceptual problems with redressing discrimination via
the equality principle, litigation confronts a number of judicially created
hurdles.
A. Intent
Some unequal treatment is unmistakable and hard to deny. The one
administering it accompanies his act with words like “You N___. You’re
just like all rest. A bunch of low-talent, lazy louts. You’re fired.” But other
forms are veiled or arrive via practices that, while seemingly neutral on their
face, exert a discriminatory effect. Sometimes, the administrator responsible
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knows about the discriminatory effect and could easily avoid it, but chooses
not to, preferring the current regime. Supreme Court decisions like
Firefighters v. Stotts97 and Griggs v. Duke Power Company98 say that this is
perfectly legal, and more recent decisions such as Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation99 and McCleskey v.
Kemp100 suggest that the Supreme Court regards the intent requirement as
“quite simply . . . a technique for not finding discrimination.”101 After
McCleskey, showing a discriminatory purpose requires “proof that the
government desired to discriminate” so that merely proving that the
government took an action with knowledge that it would have discriminatory
consequences would not suffice.102
B. State Action
Mrs. Murphy chooses not to admit minority guests into her boarding
house. This, too, is perfectly legal because she is a private citizen, not a state
actor like a hostel operator in a state park.103 Since our free-market system
relegates much of everyday life to the private sector, many racist decisions
and policies fall outside judicial purview.

97. Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
98. Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
99. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
100. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
101. See Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV.1779, 1854 (2012).
102. Mario L. Barnes and Erwin Chemerinsky, What Can Brown Do for You?: Addressing
McCleskey v. Kemp as a Flawed Standard for Measuring the Constitutionally Significant Risk
of Race Bias, 112 NW. U. L. REV 1293, 1306 (2018). See also Carrie Rosenbaum,
Immigration UnEqual Protection, YALE J. ON REG. (July 22, 2020), https://www.yalejreg
.com/nc/unequal-protection-in-immigration-law-by-carrie-rosenbaum/ (noting that “After
McCleskey, showing a discriminatory purpose required proof that the government desired to
discriminate.” Merely showing that the government took an action while aware that it would
have discriminatory consequences would not suffice. The Court’s new approach was so lax
that if lawmakers merely cleansed government acts of racial or other classifications based on
protected status, intent would evade detection. The approach embodies the “colorblindness
perspective insofar as it views all, and only decisions that overtly or covertly take race into
account as constitutionally impermissible, but rejects the view that unequal outcomes ought
to be equally constitutionally suspect.”). Id.
103. Brenna R. McLaughlin, Repealing the Fair Housing Act’s Mrs. Murphy’s
Exemption, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 149 (2018) (discussing the origin and practice of excluding
small innkeepers and boarding houses from federal fair-housing law). See Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883) (the Fourteenth Amendment can only be enforced against state action, not
private action).
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C. Equality of Opportunity Versus Equality of Result
Programs like affirmative action that aim merely to even the playing
field by giving minorities better opportunities to secure jobs and college slots
than they would otherwise enjoy, may not incorporate specific goals and
quotas.104 Nor may they aim to make up for past societal discrimination.105
Officials may strive to provide minorities notice of an opportunity or job.106
But minorities then must compete for it in the same way as everyone else
even though some of their competitors may be more advantaged and enjoy a
head start in the competition.
D. Exceptions for Wartime, Immigration, and Presidential Immunity
As though the above-mentioned obstacles were not enough, the law
provides that in a number of areas, official policy may be flagrantly
unequal.107 In wartime, the authorities may require that citizens of a certain
descent remove themselves from their homes and live in concentration
camps for the duration of the conflict.108
A different rule forbids courts from intervening in connection with
immigration practices and policies that are expressly racist.109 By the same
token, the president of the United States may, with impunity, revile members
of groups that the president’s supporters disfavor.110
E. Voting Restrictions
The Fourteenth Amendment is one of two great equality-protecting
measures; the Fifteenth Amendment is the other. The Fifteenth Amendment
provides that neither the federal government nor any state shall deny
104. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding university-level affirmative
action programs under stringent conditions).
105. See Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (striking down an
overbroad affirmative action program at UC Davis medical school).
106. See Michelle Adams & Dereck W. Black, Equality of Opportunity at the Schoolhouse
Gate, 128 YALE L.J. 2302 (2019) (discussing equality of opportunity and equality of effect
and noting that many authorities support the former, but not the latter).
107. See also Delgado, supra note 2 (noting that hate speech and animus-laced invective
are hard to correct when the President is the speaker).
108. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (declining to invalidate
wartime internment for Japanese).
109. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S 581 (1889) (announcing the plenary power doctrine
according to which immigration decrees are largely beyond judicial review power).
110. Delgado, supra note 2, (noting that presidential hate speech lies largely beyond
judicial purview).
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“citizens of the United States [the right] to vote . . . on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.”111
Voting can, theoretically, redress unfavorable treatment of one group
by another. Yet Supreme Court rulings have permitted voter purges,112
identification laws, and gerrymandering that have disproportionately
affected the poor and minorities.113 Previously, the Court approved poll
taxes,114 literacy tests,115 and grandfather clauses.116
Even if citizens are theoretically free to “vote the rascals out,” rulings
like those mentioned above, coupled with modern ones like Citizens
United117 and Shelby County v. Holder118 suggest that this is not so easy.
F. Economic Inequality
Declaring a constitutional right for something, all things considered, is
apt to benefit those who enjoy a disproportionate ownership of the
commodity at the time of the announcement.119 For example, when the
Constitution declared a due process right against the taking of a person’s
property, for example, the new protection benefitted property-holders, land-

111. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
112. See Reis Thebault & Hannah Knowles, Georgia Purged 390,000 Voters from its
Rolls. It’s the Second State to Make Cuts in Less than a Week, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/12/17/georgia-purged-voters-its-rolls-its-seco
nd-state-make-cuts-less-than-week/ (noting the increasing popularity of roll-purging in
Republican states).
113. Voter Identification Laws by State, BALLOTPEDIA (2020), https://ballotpedia.
org/Voter_ identification_laws_by_state.
114. Kelly Phillips Erb, For Election Day, A History of the Poll Tax in America, FORBES
(Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2018/11/05/just-before-theelections-a-history-of-the-poll-tax-in-america/#7fb9b4aa4e44 (describing the development
of this common voter-repression method).
115. Literacy Tests, NAT. MUSEUM OF AMER. HISTORY, https://americanhistory.si.edu/
democracy-exhibition/vote-voice/keeping-vote/state-rules-federal-rules/lieracy-tests
(last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
116. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S 347 (1915) (discussing this common practice,
especially in the South).
117. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that
corporations may contribute a practically unlimited amount to political campaigns).
118. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (declaring unconstitutional two
provisions of the federal Voting Rights Act requiring “preclearance” when certain
jurisdictions made changes in voting procedures).
119. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, LatinoCritical Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1181 (1997) (discussing
the consequences of attempting to frame or address legal issues affecting Latinos via a blackwhite binary paradigm of race).
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owners, business-owners, slaveholders, and financiers.120 “My property”
became a refrain of the propertied, not the property-less or indigent, much
less the slaves.
By the same token, the constitutionalization of equality stood to benefit
those considered to be at the center of that new guarantee, namely African
Americans, and not those who fell outside it, such as Native Americans,
Latinos, Chinese, and newly arrived immigrants from southern or eastern
Europe.121
This, in turn, raises for a second time the role of binary paradigms, this
time in terms of their compounding effect on existing inequality. Any
paradigm channels thought in ways the paradigm highlights and deems
relevant. The black-white paradigm often plays a guiding role when
government officials, program officers, and ordinary observers think about
race. In a typical case, a church committee or panel of speakers at a public
university resolves to do something about the “race problem” and reaches
out for an African American speaker or resource person. That person may
well end up performing excellently—but so might have a highly qualified
Asian American, Latinx, or Native American speaker, who remains out of
consideration because of the unconscious mindset of the member of the
committee.122
G. There’s Always an Exception
A final reason why equal protection often yields few breakthroughs is
that under current doctrine, courts need not find an equal protection violation
if the government can show that the two groups in question do not really
stand on the same footing. Perhaps one is more deserving or hard-working
than the other. Or perhaps the government has a good reason for treating the
two groups in a differential fashion. Perhaps the administrator had an
internal, perfectly sound, undisclosed reason for acting as he or she did.
Perhaps the decision even reflected a compelling interest. Equal protection
is a weak reed on which to base a claim for redress if an adjudicator can
readily conjure up reasons why it should not apply to the case at hand.

120. Id. at 1190 (noting that new rights generally benefit those who are their immediate
holders).
121. See text at supra note 19–20, discussing Perea’s influential article.
122. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Fifteenth Chronicle, 75 TEX. L. REV. 11811, 1195
(1997) (discussing the “out of mind” phenomenon).
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IV. Racial Binaries
As mentioned previously, any legal approach based on principles of
equality is apt to proceed by comparing two groups, hence the term “racial
binary.”123 This approach, which is not at all necessary or inevitable, invites
critical reconsideration.
A. Inhibiting Coalition
As Juan Perea has noted, any decision that purports to consider two
racial groups, and two only, tends to marginalize other groups and
discourage them from making common cause with the group that finds itself
at the center.124 It can also pit groups against each other, when they would
do better to join forces in an attempt to enlarge opportunities that both might
enjoy.125 By the same token, it can interfere with group members’ ability to
generalize, appreciate their common dilemma, and to see the big picture.126
B. Inducing Dependence on Whites
Not only does the black-white binary paradigm of race discourage
minority groups of color from working together, it can impede reform efforts
by encouraging one group in a coalition to secede and join forces with the
superior group that had been oppressing both.127 This can happen when a
group decides to ignore history and patterns of repression and betrayal by the
dominant group.128 It can also occur when a group disdains an opportunity
to forge coalitions with similarly-situated minority groups in hopes of
finding favor elsewhere.129

123. See text at supra notes 16–21.
124. See Perea, supra note 20. See also Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Toolkit: Fit to
Dismantle that Famous House?, 75 NYU L. REV. 283, 290-95 (2000) (discussing some of the
problems inherent in the black-white binary approach to racial problems).
125. Delgado, supra note 122.
126. Id. at 296–99.
127. Delgado, supra note 122, at 299–300.
128. See Perea, supra note 20. See also Delgado, supra note 122 (discussing some of the
problems inherent in the black-white binary approach to racial problems).
129. Id. (citing examples where rigid black/white thinking impairs flexibility and creation
coalition-making).
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C. Multi-Group Oppression and the New Southern Strategy
Earlier, we noted how some of these adverse forces were already at play
in the South and nationally. In a number of articles,130 we noted the recent
appearance of what we termed the “new Southern Strategy.” In this strategy,
members of the Republican Party attempt to deport and marginalize the
numbers and political participation of Latino/a immigrants with the end goal
of eliminating most forms of welfare and forcing Black people to accept
work, such as cleaning houses, serving food, or picking crops, that reminds
them of slavery.131
A prime goal of civil rights struggles might well be to free ourselves
from binary thinking of all kinds. If each group insists on maintaining its
own binary framework, the other groups will correctly perceive that it is,
even if unintentionally, marginalizing them and steer clear of coalitions that
could benefit them all. The framework of civil rights action must take
different forms for each group and take into account their distinct histories
and experiences—slavery, removal, Conquest, exclusion. The groups need
to converge if, in the end, any of them is likely to make much progress.
Conclusion
When examined critically, equality turns out to be at best an
occasionally useful tool for redressing racial wrongs. As has been seen, it is
less helpful for nonblack minorities, like Native Americans, Latinos/as, and
Asian Americans than it is for Blacks. Moreover, persisting in it can lead to
a black-white binary approach that suffers a number of deficiencies and can
affirmatively make matters worse for Blacks. Social science, as well as
racial history, show that much more stands to be gained from reform efforts
based on struggle, solidarity, struggle, voting, and righteous indignation,
performed, if possible, in coalition with others.

130. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Southern Dreams and a New Theory of First
Amendment Legal Realism, 65 EMORY L.J. 303 (2015); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s
Footnote: Multi-Group Oppression and a Theory of Judicial Review, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1 (2017); Richard Delgado, A New Strategy of Multi-Group Oppression, 7 CALIF. L. REV.
ONLINE 49 (2016).
131. E.g., Delgado, supra note 128.
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